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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judges often malign exception making as the erosion of legal rules, yet 
in the same breath sanction the territory that exceptions have eclipsed to 
date. Judges may embrace as precedent the course of exceptions that has 
shaped doctrine so far, but then cite the importance of enforcing common 
law rules to refuse exceptions that would redress violence against women. 
This paradoxical stance prompts many feminists to target ignorance of 
violence in women's lives as the source of judicial resistance to 
establishing exceptions to rules that prevent recovery for women's harms. 
These feminists call for education, for increased awareness, to combat this 
ignorance. I This article considers judicial resistance to making exceptions 
to rules in adjudication of certain tort claims by victims of domestic 
violence and proposes that the supposed blind spot surrounding this 
resistance will not be erased through enlightenment. 
Feminist legal scholars and practitioners such as Robin West, Elizabeth 
Schneider, and Clare Dalton express the notion that if judges were to see 
more cases and the rules they produce through women's eyes, reform to 
eradicate gender biases in law would follow? Drawing on the legal realist 
1. Other postmodern feminists have observed that speaking out about women's issues 
subjects such speech to further regulation. That battered women have been treated as 
insane, ego-less victims (see Part III below), is one example of how efforts to speak out and 
inteIject women's stories into legal discourse subjects those stories, and speakers, to 
unfavorable regulation. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, In the Jolds of our own discourse:' The 
Pleasures and Freedom of Silence, 3 U. CHI. L. SCB. ROUNDTABLE 185 (1996). This article 
builds on the critique of compulsory feminist discursivity to explore one pervasive mode of 
unfavorable regulation (namely, subjection to the discourse of legal argumentation) of 
speech about domestic violence. 
2. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol 
Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990); Clare Dalton, Domestic 
Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 
319, 333 (1997) [hereinafter Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce]; 
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in 
the Family Court System, 17 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 273 (1999) [hereinafter 
Dalton, When Paradigms Collide]; ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND 
FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's 
Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. 
REp. 195, 197 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral 
and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 477, 505 (1996) [hereinafter Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination]; 
Robin West, Fifteenth Anniversary Celebration: The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: 
A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149 (2000) 
[hereinafter West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives]; Robin West, Jurisprudence 
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 1-3, 14-15, 58-60 (1988); Robin West, Towards 
Humanistic Theories of Legal Justice, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 147 (1998). Much of 
this scholarship operates on the following premises: Premise 1: There are harms that are 
suffered disproportionately by women. Premise 2: The way in which the common law 
redresses these harms is inadequate for women. Premise 3: The common law can and 
should redress these harms to a greater extent than it does currently. F:ollowing from these 
three premises and incorporating many ofthe premises and conclusions of legal realism (see 
infi-a note 3), such feminists reason further that the common law would provide greater 
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conception that judges do (and should) make law in light of the factual 
consequences of their decisions,3 they reason that if more judges 
understood how violence makes the lives of many women differ from the 
life of the prototypical legal c1aimant,4 they would grant such women 
redress even if it required departure from precedent. For example, 
arguments to apply different voice theory in tort law hold this view,s and 
though different voice theory has been criticized for its potential to 
reinforce gender-based stereotypes,6 a broad range of feminists frequently 
appeal to the redemptive power of knowledge as a catalyst to progress.7 
redress if judges were more enlightened as to how women's situations differ from situations 
underscoring certain common law rules. 
3. Legal realists reject the formalist idea that principles of law are neutral and 
independent of politics or of the political leanings of adjudicators. They are committed to 
the ideas that the particular facts of a case are more crucial to its outcome than abstract 
principles of law, that the justification for laws lies in their factual ramifications, and that 
laws should evolve in response to the changing practical needs of society. Legal realism 
developed in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to turn of the century formalism and 
remains influential today as the lineal predecessor of law and economics, much of feminist 
legal scholarship and practice, and critical legal theory. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of 
Beliefin Modem American Law: A View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1999). 
See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Karl 
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930); 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Roscoe 
Pound, The Call for a RealistJurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1931). 
4. Legal rules contemplate specific legal subjects based on dominant conceptions of 
rational behavior. The "reasonable man" or "reasonable person" standard in tort law is one 
example of how the law presumes a prototypical claimant. Another such example is the 
assumption implicit in the statute of limitations on assault and battery that a reasonable 
person would sue \vithin two years of the incident. 
5. Different voice theory teaches that women have a greater sense of interconnectedness 
than men and place greater emphasis on relationships than on individual rights. See MARy 
FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF, 
VOICE, AND MIND (1986); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VorCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Feminist legal scholars such as Leslie 
Bender, Robin West, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow have applied this theory to law by arguing 
that women favor an ethic of care for others over justice or rights models of morality and 
that the law should draw on this women's perspective to develop rules that value 
interconnectedness and interpersonal responsibility. See Bender, supra note 2 (arguing that 
tort law's abstract posture informed by liberalism'S concerns for autonomy is essentially 
male, and that it prevents courts from considering social contexts informing many women's 
claims, so, courts should learn from feminist critiques and adopt an ethic of care in decision 
making); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 2, at 1-3, 14-15,58-60; West, The 
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 2; West, Towards Humanistic Theories of 
Legal Justice, supra note 2; Carrie Menke1-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: 
Speculation on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985). 
6. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Sexual Equality and Sexual Difference in American Law, 26 
NEW ENG. L. REv. 665, 678-79, 681 (1992); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: 
Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1176 
(1992). 
7. "Since 1980, nearly every state and more than half of the federal courts have 
commissioned studies about the pervasiveness and impact of gender bias in their systems. 
Nearly all found some degree of bias." Margaret Graham Tebo, Equal Justice, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 2000, at 44 (2000). The studies that contained recommendations called for public 
education programs and better training of court personnel. ld. The National Organization 
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Irrespective of whether feminist legal scholars support different voice 
theory's premise that women (because they are women) have partiCUlar 
insights that law should learn from, it makes sense that the law would 
benefit from a more subtle understanding of women's experiences, 
however varied, and however such understanding might come to be.8 
This article accepts that harms related to domestic violence women 
disproportionately suffer,9 and that the common law provides inadequate 
recourse for these harms. JO Despite both greater awareness of domestic 
for Women (NOW) Legal Defense Fund runs a project called the National Judicial 
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts. Id. The 
director of that program reported to the ABA Journal that "more training of judges and more 
public education to counter stereotypes are key" to fight inequality in courts. Id. Like the 
current NOW Legal Defense Project, early grassroots efforts to address the issue of 
domestic violence in the 1970s quickly identified education and awareness as primary goals 
of the movement to fight domestic violence. The steering committee of The National 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) identified two out of its five central 
missions as: "4. To educate the public to a non-acceptance of violence and to strive towards 
the complete elimination of violence in our society. 5. To support and initiate change in 
traditional sex-role expectations for women and men." R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. 
DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 36-37 (1992). The members ofNCADV 
link public education regarding violence directly to the elimination of violence in society. 
Further, they imply that cultural enlightenment regarding connections between traditional 
gender roles and violence against women will help change traditional sex role expectations 
and subsequently eliminate not only violence itself, but also the possibility of violence. 
8. Feminist scholars such as Leslie Bender and Elizabeth Schneider imply that more 
complete understanding of the social context informing a case and its litigants would give 
judges a vantage-point from which to adjudicate between individualist and altruist impulses, 
legal rules and legal standards presented in any given case. See Bender, supra note 2; 
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 2; Schneider, 
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work, supra note 2; Schneider, Self-
Defense and Relations of Domination, supra note 2. 
9. Though many victims of domestic violence are men abused by women or other men, 
and women abused by women, according to studies, ninety to ninety-five percent of the 
victims of domestic assaults are women abused by men. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra 
note 7, at 265. "Studies have shown that more women are abused by their husbands or 
boyfriends than are injured in car accidents, muggings, or rape, and that 3 to 4 million 
households live with violence every day." BEVERLY BALOS & MARy LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW 
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 183 (1994) (quoting NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND 
FAMILY LAW, THE EFFECT OF WOMAN ABUSE ON CmLDREN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL 
AUTHORITY i (1991)). 
10. Case law available for discussion involving claims by battered women is quite 
limited. One assumption regarding the low number of civil actions filed by battered women 
could be that the financial damages available in such suits are not large enough to provide 
adequate incentive. However, domestic violence occurs at all socioeconomic levels. 
Lenore Walker found that battered women come from diverse backgrounds - it is a myth 
that middle or upper-class women experience battering less often or less severely than poor 
women. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 18-19 (1979). A study has 
shown that 51 percent of battered women had no access to credit card accounts, 34 percent 
did not have access to checking accounts, and 21 percent could not obtain cash in any way. 
See Melissa J. Pena, The Role of Appellate Courts in Domestic Violence Cases and the 
Prospect of New Partner Abuse Cause of Action, 20 REv. LITIG. 503, 506 (2001). A 
battered woman's financial dependence on her abuser can make her unable to leave the 
relationship. Ajudgment in tort is one way to secure financial resources. Id. For women 
whose abusers have a substantial income, pursuing a tort claim can be a very fruitful way to 
attain the financial independence with which to start a new life. See Edward S. Snyder, 
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violence and the continuing influence oflegal realism in adjudication, strict 
applications of precedent to claims made by women whose lives (because 
of violence) significantly diverge from those of prototypical claimants 
endure." To redress some of the harms caused by domestic violence, 
adjudicators would need to establish exceptions to current doctrine for 
women who experience incapacity resulting from abuse. For example, the 
common law has refused to yield an established exception to the statute of 
limitations on assault and battery for a woman who could not sue earlier 
because she suffered from "battered woman syndrome" (hereinafter 
BWS).12 Consequently, the statute of limitations bars such claimants from 
recovering meaningful damages from their abusers.13 
Remediesfor Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
L. 335 (1994). The fact that so few cases exist, given the magnitude of the domestic 
violence problem, evidences the dearth of opportunity to recover damages from an abusive 
partneratcommonla\~ 
11. If there is either (1) some truth to the realist conception that judges make law with a 
view towards the factual consequences of their decisions, or (2) some truth to the idea that 
exceptions and exception making are necessary to the meaning and authority oflegal rules, 
and some value in treating the common law as a source of justice, then it is worth asking 
how and why decisions that fail to grant victims of domestic violence sufficient damages 
persist. "Or" conjoins the preceding sentence because from within the theoretical 
framework developed in Parts II, III, and IV below, we need not appeal to the pragmatism 
of the realists to advocate for exception·making. The question at issue - why adjudicators 
have not established more exceptions (yielding new doctrine) for victims of domestic 
violence can be approached from a procedural, as well as a substantive, political angle. 
12. "Battered woman syndrome" is a psychological condition suffered by women who 
have repeatedly endured physical and/or emotional abuse by their partners. The syndrome 
is characterized by low self·esteem, passivity, and a condition oflearned helplessness. See 
WALKER, supra note 10. However, given the diverse experiences of battered women, there 
is not necessarily one, accurate, all-inclusive definition of this syndrome. See A. Renee 
Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic 
Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1994). 
Elizabeth Schneider argues that use of "battered woman syndrome" in court cases has been 
detrimental to women because it focuses on the woman's incapacity, rather than on why a 
battered woman's actions in course of an abusive relationship are reasonable from her 
perspective. See SCHNEIDER, BATIERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 2. 
Also, she writes that "common and undifferentiated use of the term 'battered woman 
syndrome' has heightened general confusion about domestic violence." Schneider, Self-
Defense and Relations of Domination, supra note 2, at 505. 
13. The statute of limitations has been one of the greatest obstacles to recovery for 
battered spouses who sue their abusers. Dalton, When Paradigms Collide, supra note 2, at 
259-64; David E. Poplar, Comment, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Battered Women 
After Glovine v. Glovine: Creating Equitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 
101 DICK. L. REv. 161, 162 (1996). When battered women seek redress through tort law, 
years of violent assaults often go unrecompensed because the statute of limitations bars 
recovery for any incident two years prior to the suit. The first time a batterer beats his 
partner she is not likely to sue. Even after the second or third battering she may still believe 
that the assaults are isolated incidents that will not recur or that she can change her abuser. 
By the time she concludes that the beatings will not stop and brings suit, the statute of 
limitations will likely have run out for all but the most recent abuse. See Rhonda L. Kohler, 
Note, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 
25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1025, 1052~53 (1992). For a more complete discussion, see infra 
notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
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This article offers an explanation of why making judges more aware of 
the harms of domestic violence does not proliferate common law causes of 
action to redress these harms. Drawing on descriptive insights regarding 
intractable conflicts in consciousness raised by Eve Sedgwick14 in the field 
of literary criticism and Duncan Kennedy in the field of critical legal 
studies (hereinafter CLS),15 this article explores how knowledge of the 
14. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick uses literary criticism to explore how the ideas of the closet, 
coming out, homo- and hetero-sexuality permeate and define Western culture. See EVE 
KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990). Scholars concerned with 
the legal status of sexual minorities frequently invoke Sedgwick's work to address the 
threshold question "who is homosexual" to explore how the complexity of defining sexual 
minorities affects prospects for such minorities' legal inclusion and protection. See, e.g., 
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the 
Apartheid of the Closet, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 703 (1997); Janet Halley, Gay Rights and 
the Courts: The Amendment 2 Controversy: Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429 
(1997); Janet Halley, Intersections: Sexuality, Cultural Tradition, and the Law, 8 YALE J. L. 
& HUMAN. 93 (1996); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and 
the U.S. Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1141 (1997). This 
article extracts from Sedgwick's discussion of the epistemology of the closet that intractable 
contradictions between universalizing and minoritizing, and integrative and separatist 
discourses - pervade our collective consciousness, and that there is no vantage point from 
which to reconcile these contradictions. 
15. One unifying statement to describe all of CLS scholarship is difficult to formulate. 
However, a recurring theme in CLS work is that conceptual contradictions that cannot be 
consistently reconciled (between rules and standards, value objectivity and subjectivity, free 
choice and determinism) pervade much of liberal legal thought. CLS scholarship has drawn 
various conclusions regarding the political and doctrinal effects of such contradictions. One 
conclusion is that liberal legal thought suppresses recognition of conceptual contradictions 
themselves, and by de-emphasizing one of the two poles within a contradiction, leaves the 
opposite pole in a privileged, even hegemonic, position within legal discourse. This 
suppression of contradiction and privileging of one pole creates a latent ideological tilt 
(towards the right) embedded in liberal legal thought. Another conclusion is that 
contradictions lead to indeterminacy of result and indeterminacy of justification, such that a 
judge can issue a reasoned opinion in favor of either party in any given suit. The 
conservative tilt latent in liberal legal thought, in combination with the indeterminacy of 
legal reasoning, results in a masking or concealment of relations of domination in legal 
discourse. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITlQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIEcLE} 236-63 
(1997); Mark Hager, Book Review: Against Liberal Ideology: A GUlDE TO CRITlCAL LEGAL 
STUDIES, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. U. L. Rev. 1051 (1988); E. Dana Neacsu, CLS Standsfor 
Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL'y 415 (2000); Lawrence B. 
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 462 
(1987); John Stick, Book Review, Charting the Development of Critical Legal Studies: A 
GUlDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES. By Mark Kelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 407 (1988). 
CLS has been widely criticized on several levels. CLS has been charged with 
internal inconsistency in that many CLS scholars' substantive, leftist political aspirations 
imply a retreat to appeals to a "rule of law" to enforce legislative mandates to advance the 
positions of identifiable groups. Critics of CLS observe that CLS "waivers between charges 
that these contradictions lead to indeterminacy of result, indeterminacy of justification, 
invisible ideological tilt, and political pacification through constraint of the imagination," 
but then cannot whole-heartedly condenm liberal legal theory because of commitment to 
some sort ofleftist political project. Stick, supra, at 412; see KENNEDY, supra, at 11,294 
(discussing the tension between leftist political aspirations and a modernist/postmodemist 
analytical approach). 
CLS is also criticized for attacking the idea that principles of law can be neutral and 
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violence women suffer interacts with a privilege of ignorance harbored by 
courts such that we cannot expect enlightenment of adjudicators to yield 
common law causes of action to recover for domestic abuse. 
Sedgwick argues in The Epistemology of the Closet16 that a crisis of 
modern sexual definition has produced an "internal incoherence and mutual 
contradiction of each of the forms of discursive and institutional 'common 
sense' on [sexual definition] inherited from the architects of our present 
culture.,,17 One aspect of internal incoherence on which Sedgwick focuses 
involves the simultaneous designation of homosexuality as an act and as 
status. Irreconcilable acts-oriented universalizing and status-oriented 
minoritizing discourses surround the open secret of homosexuality in our 
culture, pervading crucial nodes of cultural organization.lS There is no 
intelligible standpoint from which to reconcile or adjudicate between these 
conflicting discourses.19 The dynamics of the act/status dilemma 
explicated by Sedgwick recur in claims by battered women as they find 
themselves caught between an integrative discourse of acts of assault, 
battery, and bringing suit, and a separatist discourse of status as being ill or 
as occupying a perspective from which their acts can be understood as 
reasonable. Feminist consciousness raising efforts aim to shift discursive 
and institutional common sense about women and domestic violence. This 
article considers the consequences of the internal incoherence embedded in 
such common sense for increasing awareness as a reform strategy. 
In a development similar to Sedgwick's in legal scholarship, Kennedy 
for uncovering structures of domination embedded in legal discourse, without offering a 
theory of law or political prescription that could replace appeals to abstract rules. See e.g., 
Book Note: Duncan Kennedy's Stiff Knees, III HARv. L. REv. 2117, 2121 (1998) 
[hereinafter Duncan Kennedy's Stiff Knees]. Without a viable alternative to formalism (and 
liberalism), CLS admits the possibility ofmajoritarian rule too susceptible to totalitarianism 
without prescription for what might check such forces. 
Because CLS has not adequately addressed these criticisms, the movement is largely 
considered in the past tense. I treat CLS here as an intellectual development with many 
descriptive insights useful for lUlderstanding how a strong adherence to abstract principles 
of law continues to prove indispensable despite the elusiveness of any external referent or 
source from which such principles could be derived. This article finds formal qualities of 
law (such as adherence to precedent out of fidelity to an abstract rule of law) to be 
simultaneously deconstructible and indispensable. 
16. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 84-90. 
17. Id. at 1. 
18. Sedgwick draws on Michel Foucault's work, which speaks of an intractable "double 
bind" constituted by simultaneous individualization and totalization of structures of power. 
See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 17- 31 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1979). 
19. See SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 86-90. Sedgwick's writing about intractable 
cultural conflicts focuses on the ideas of sexual definition, the closet, and coming out. She 
both finds these ideas inextricable from their gay origins, and makes an "introductory case 
for a hypothesis about the centrality of this nominally marginal, conceptually intractable set 
of definitional issues to the important know1edges and lUlderstandings of twentieth-century 
Western culture as a whole." Id. at 2. Sedgwick makes no representation as to applicability 
of her argument beyond discussions of sexual definition, but finds the idea of the closet and 
coming out to permeate many nodes of cultural organization. 
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(in Fonn and Substance in Private Law Adjudication20 and A Critique of 
Adjudication (fin de sieclefl) finds the centrality of the experience of 
contradiction - between individualism and altruism, rules and standards -
to be "one of the defining traits of modernism and its sequelae.',z2 There is 
no epistemological grounding from which to adjudicate between the two 
sides of contradictory argument pairs through which principles are brought 
to bear on choice of legal rules.23 From within the analogous analytical 
frameworks presented by Sedgwick and Kennedy, fundamental 
contradictions obviate any standpoint from which to reconcile their 
conflicting sides. If there is no metatheory with which to reconcile 
conflicting cultural or discursive impulses, then there is no way to police 
how adjudicators constantly slip between conflicting argumentative modes 
reflective of cultural incoherence. If there is no metatheory with which to 
reconcile internal incoherence, then there is no coherent understanding to 
cultivate, nor presentation to make of battered women (individually or 
collectively) that is consistently beneficial to advancing their possibilities 
for recovery at common law. 
Sedgwick and Kennedy develop similar contradiction theories, but 
Sedgwick takes an important additional step regarding the relationship 
between power and ignorance - a privilege of unknowing. Given the 
parallelism regarding contradictions at the heart of Sedgwick's and 
Kennedy's work, this article extracts Sedgwick's further contribution with 
respect to ignorance,24 to propose a relationship between a privilege of 
20. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. 
REv. 1685 (1976). 
21. KENNEDY, supra note 15. 
22. Id. at 207; see also, Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1685. Form and Substance is one 
example of CLS' s use of contradiction theory (as are parts of Critique of Adjudication). See 
supra, note 15. (See infra Part II.B, for a summary of contradiction theory in these works.) 
Form and Substance exemplifies a radical mode of CLS scholarship, which takes a 
deconstructionist approach to legal norms to argue that the law cannot be objective. (A 
more moderate mode of CLS scholarship, exemplified by some critical race theory and 
feminist theory, excavates latent systems of domination embedded in legal norms, but does 
not so thoroughly dismantle the possibility of objective legal norms.) 
Some scholars have rejected Kennedy's argument that the adoption of rules as 
opposed to standards belies a commitment to individualist, not altruist, ideology. Altruist 
positions can be furthered by rules and individualist positions by standards in some contexts. 
Whether Kennedy can support his alignment of individualism with rules and altruism with 
standards does not affect the efficacy of drawing on his presentation of fundamental 
contradictions to critique appeals to enlightenment as a means to feminist reform in 
common law or to assess the common law's capacity for such reform. This article presents 
Kennedy's contradiction thesis parallel to Sedgwick's contradiction thesis in part to 
multiply levels of possible alignments of adjudicative positions with cultural implications 
with ideological predominance. The usefulness of Kennedy's argument lies in its 
presentation of a periphery of exceptions as presupposed by and included in a core of rules, 
and that the exercise of rule or exception-making is conducted against a background of 
altruist and individualist, integrative and separatist impulses, irrespective of the alignment of 
those impulses at any given moment. 
23. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 209. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23. 
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ignorance and the disappointing results of educating judicial actors in 
hopes of reform. Ignorance is not a thick cognitive darkness from which 
people emerge into the light of understanding. Rather, ignorance is 
pluralized and specified to correspond to various regimes of knowledge 
(which themselves can be seen as true or false). 
This writing is not about judges who are decidedly unsympathetic to 
victims of domestic violence judges whose views may be described as 
ignorant just because it is incomprehensible to many how they could know 
about domestic violence and not sympathize. In addition, this article is not 
about adjudicators who may understand domestic violence and sympathize 
with its victims, but resolutely consider it their duty to apply precedent 
strictly.25 Nor does this article focus on resolutely pragmatist judges who 
always rule to produce justice given the facts and claimants before them. 
Rather, it considers the constellation of knowledges and ignorances 
informing adjudicators who operate between impulses to apply precedent 
strictly and to grant justice to disadvantaged claimants at the expense of 
adherence to an abstract rule of law. It explores what might be the 
knowledge (institutional or individual) to which ignorance operative in the 
adjudication of claims by victims of domestic violence corresponds. 
Applying Sedgwick's and Kennedy's contradiction theories, this article 
finds battered women's claims seeking exception to a common law rule 
interchangeably within a core of formal common law rules or a periphery 
of standards and exceptions, and interchangeably universalizing or 
minoritizing for the litigants involved. Intractable contradictions preclude 
any epistemological grounding from which to adjudicate among the 
multiple levels of incoherence involved in cases brought by battered 
women. Feminist demands for a greater understanding of context - to 
create, for example, a reformed tort law system in which courts understand 
and take into account the complex situation of battered women plaintiffs -
seek the epistemological grounding from which to adjudicate that 
contradictions posit non-existent. Fundamental contradictions refract the 
light that even thorough education regarding women's situations could aim 
to shed on any given case. As a matter of adjudicative process, 
contradictions enable courts to maintain an epistemological privilege of 
25. In other words, this argument does not target decisions by adjudicators who 
consciously subscribe to the legal process school (begun by Felix. Frankfurter and Henry 
Hart and currently furthered by Antonin Scalia) and adhere to a strong version of the rule of 
law for the explicit sake of fortifying the legitimacy of judicial decision-making. For 
example, some judges may have an intricate understanding of domestic violence and the 
particular problems of the litigants before them, but choose to follow precedent (despite 
"short-changing" such litigants) because they consider it their duty as judges to strictly 
apply precedent. Such judges may be steeped in knowledge of the fragility of democratic 
institutions and seek reinforcement of such institutions by maximizing the extent to which 
courts can rely on a strong version of the rule of law. Descendants of the realists can 
descnDe them as ignorant of the elusive nature of the rules to which they ascribe or the lack 
of justice their rulings produce. 
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ignorance. 
Part ILA below explains Sedgwick's sense of intractable cultural 
conflict surrounding open secrets in sexual defInition and the fundamental 
contradictions operative in such conflict. Part ILB presents Kennedy's 
view of irreconcilable contradictions in legal discourse as basically parallel 
to Sedgwick's intractable cultural conflicts. Part II.C compares Sedgwick's 
and Kennedy's writings and relates them to battered women's claims in 
court. Part m presents an example of how the theoretical frameworks 
presented in Part II operate in adjudication of claims for recovery beyond 
the statute of limitations by victims of domestic violence. Part IV explores 
how a privilege of ignorance informs adjudication of claims by battered 
women and the relationship between contradictions and this privilege of 
ignorance. 
Several possible conclusions might be drawn from this argument, such 
as: "common law cannot yield meaningful reform regarding violence 
against women (but legislation might);,,26 or "efforts to heighten judges' 
awareness of domestic violence are ineffectual;,,27 or "focusing on how to 
profIt in any given lawsuit from the incoherent discourses at play (rather 
than on how to fInd consistency between them) will maximize women's 
recourse.,,28 This article does not aim to stand behind anyone such 
conclusion. It provides an explanation for why feminists' efforts to raise 
awareness of the harms of domestic violence do not produce more common 
law recovery for these harms?9 
fhis article presents domestic violence as an open secret in our culture 
fated to interface at common law with the open secret in American 
1 
26. This article questions, but does not completely dismiss the possibility of reform 
favorable to victims of abuse through common law, and does not consider at all the 
possibility of reform through legislation. 
27. The analysis in this article is not broad enough to support a conclusion that education 
of judges is completely ineffectual or has no bearing on the outcome of claims by victims of 
domestic violence. Rather, this piece shows how any knowledge about domestic violence 
imparted to judges must be subjugated, regulated and reformulated in the face of legal 
discourse and cultural discourse, such that the effects of education are unImown at best. In 
any event, the very limited scope of circumstances under which increased awareness might 
produce progress in the common law is radically incommensurate with the broad, common 
sense faith in the power of consciousness raising that underscores so much feminist legal 
analysis. 
28. This conclusion would require consideration of how and why this type of approach 
avoids simply re-Iocating the ethical-political issue of what is the right way to act in 
response to domestic violence to a specific and local level. See Duncan Kennedy's Stiff 
Knees, supra note 15, at 2122 (citing RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Foucault: Critique as a 
Philosophic Ethos, in THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POUTICAL HORIZONS OF 
MODERNITY/PoSTMODERNlTY 142, 161 (1991». 
29. By disrupting the notion that we can cause common law reform by opening more 
eyes to women's particular situations, I in no way intend to discourage the important work 
of filing and arguing cases on behalf of battered women ,vith claims to be made. Rather, 
any long-term, strategic alignment of resources, women's needs and the law's power 
requires thoughtful exploration of the nature of courts' institutional authority, privileged 
iguorance, and common feminist premises regarding reform. 
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jurisprudence that the myth of an abstract rule of law (fonnulated almost 
entirely in reference to a rational, white, male legal subject) is at the same 
time readily deconstructed, yet crucial and indispensable. It relates 
ignorance, the open secret of domestic violence, and the necessity of 
perpetuating an abstract rule of law in adjudication, to suggest ultimately 
that ignorance of violence in women's lives can be viewed as central to the 
maintenance of courts' institutional authority. 
II. PARALLEL SCHOLARLY DEVELOPMENTS FOCUSED ON 
CONTRADICTIONS IN CONSCIOUSNESS 
This section presents some central theoretical components of each of 
Sedgwick's and Kennedy's writings. It draws out certain theories that are 
pivotal to their work and provides a reading of them to critique feminist 
theory and tort claims by battered women. 
The incoherence and contradiction that Sedgwick describes surface 
through cultural pairings such as secrecy and disclosure, private and public, 
masculine and feminine, and many others. Cultural pairings result from the 
dependency of concepts on contrast or opposing concepts for meaning. For 
example, secrecy only has meaning in reference to disclosure. We only 
understand masculine because of an implicit understanding of feminine -
an implied, presupposed opposite of masculine. Our understanding of 
common law rules presupposes exceptions. Rule administration in our 
common law system implies a necessity of exception making. Cultural 
pairings are series of such binarisms - concepts and their inextricable 
opposites - that surface repeatedly in discourse surrounding various nodes 
of cultural organization to produce meaning and social order. Nodes of 
cultural organization refer to the topics or subjects around which motal and 
social orders are produced and enforced, such as sexuality, gender, and 
profession. 
Contradictory treatment surrounding some node of social organization, 
such as sexuality and the idea of the closet, or adjudication and exception-
making, functions as an open secret Domestic violence is an open secret 
It derives its cultural meaning through contradictory discourses of, for 
example, secrecy, privacy, and femininity surrounding domesticity, yet at 
the same time disclosure, public indignation (either for revealing the 
problem or for suppressing it), and masculinity surrounding control of the 
household suggested by domesticity. Likewise, the elusiveness of a 
coherent core of legal rules is an open secret We understand this core to 
embody an abstract rule of law, the elusiveness of which courts do not 
publicly acknowledge, adherence to which provides a basis for courts' 
institutional authority. Yet we make open appeals to the malleability of 
rules, to adjudicators' power to define a rule by stating what it is not 
By invoking contradiction theory, I do not intend to imply either that 
the contradictions themselves cause injustice to women, or that we could 
strive for some better order in which deep-seated contradictions are 
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resolved. Presenting the contradictions in legal discourse described by 
Kennedy alongside the cultural discursive contradictions described by 
Sedgwick suggests that intractable contradictions will permeate crucial 
aspects of virtually any social order that has been exposed to varying 
ideologies. 
A. INTRACTABLE CULTURAL CONFLICT: SEDGWICK'S CRISIS OF SEXUAL 
DEFINITION AT THE CENTER OF WESTERN CONSCIOUSNESS 
This section summarizes Sedgwick's analysis of the contradictions 
operative in discourses surrounding the closet. Parts IT.C, ITLB, and IV 
apply her analysis to explore how these same contradictions operate in 
adjudication of claims by battered women who sue their abusers. The idea 
of the closet and coming out imply a coherent darlmess and a subject 
emerging from that darlmess. Sedgwick's analysis of the cultural crisis of 
homo/ heterosexual definition complicates the schema of a dark closet and 
a coherent subject emerging from it.30 This article applies Sedgwick's 
work to legal claims by battered women to show that there is neither a 
coherent dark (of ignorance of domestic violence) nor a coherent female 
subject to draw out of that dark in making battered women's claims in 
court. 
Sedgwick argues that the idea of the closet does not just inform 
understanding of homosexuality or gay people. Rather, it has saturated 
many different aspects of our culture.31 However, that the idea of the closet 
permeates our culture does not give it meaning irrespective of its 
speCifically gay originS.32 To the contrary, the many nodes of cultural 
organization affected by the idea of the closet are implicated in what 
Sedgwick calls a crisis of homo/ heterosexual definition33 that is "organized 
around a radical and irreducible incoherence,,34 between two types of 
discourses: one integrative, the other separatist. A discourse is integrative 
if it is universalizing, if it erodes distinction between its subjects and 
society as a whole. A discourse is separatist if it is minoritizing, if it erects 
or fortifies distinction between its subjects and society as a whole. 
In addition, this discursive incoherence operates on two levels. The 
first level involves conceptions of what gay and straight mean. Here, a 
separatist discourse of status, of persons who "really are" gay, 
irreconcilably coexists with a conflicting, integrative discourse of acts, 
30. See SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 78-82. 
31. The Sixties have been described as the "decade when Black people came out of the 
closet." Id. at 72. A 1989 Republican National Committee memo called for Representative 
Tom Foley to "come out of the liberal closet" and acknowledge his left wing voting record. 
Id. at 72 n.6. Sedgwick herself writes about coming out of the closet as a fat woman. Id. at 
72. 
32. Id. 
33. !d. at 72-73. 
34. Id. at 85. 
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bisexual potential, and sodomy models.35 The separatist discourse is 
minoritizing in its focus on homosexuals as a discrete, relatively small 
class. The integrative discourse, on the other hand, is universalizing in its 
focus on acts of sodomy towards which all people could have impulse.36 
The second level involves conceptions of homosexual gender (again, 
also organized around integrative and separatist tropes). Here, one 
discourse reads homosexual persons in terms of inversion or transitivity -
the idea of "a woman trapped in a man's body" or vice versa.37 Sedgwick 
finds this discourse integrative in its "preservation of an essential 
heterosexuality within desire itself.,,38 But, at the same time, another 
discourse presents gender as a continuum. From the standpoint of this 
discourse of homosexual gender, Sedgwick writes: "far from its being the 
essence of desire to cross boundaries of gender, it is instead the most 
natural thing in the world that people of the same gender ... should bond 
also on the axis of sexual desire.',39 This discourse is separatist in its 
location of desire in two completely separate male and female spheres, 
homosexual desire marking the defining center of those spheres. 
Sedgwick argues that these two sets of conflicting discourses - one 
integrative, the other separatist - represent a crisis: 
[M]any of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth-
century Western culture as a whole are structured - indeed, 
fractured - by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/ heterosexual 
definition .... [such that] virtually any aspect of modem Western , 
culture must be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central 
substance to the degree that it does not incorporate a critical 
analysis of modem homo/ heterosexual definition .... 40 
That ''the trope of the closet is so close to the heart of some modem 
preoccupations,,41 attests to how deeply the irreducible incoherence 
Sedgwick describes surrounding sexuality saturates our culture. Sedgwick 
explains that the epistemologically charged pairings of secrecy and 
disclosure, and private and public, are condensed into the figures of ''the 
closet" and "coming out," and through these pairings, homo and 
heterosexual definition shapes other pairings crucial to cultural 
organization, such as health and illness, and knowledge and ignorance.42 
In addition, Sedgwick states that although numerous writers and 
thinkers have attempted to reconcile the conflicting integrative and 
35. Id. at 85, 88. 
36. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 85-88. 
37. Id. at 87. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1. 
41. Id. at 72. 
42. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 72. 
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separatist discourses, none have or will succeed:43 
A higher valuation on the transformative and labile play of desire, 
a higher valuation on gay identity and gay community: neither of 
these. .. seems to get any purchase on the stranglehold of the 
available and ruling paradigm-clash .... I have no optimism at all 
about the availability of a standpoint of thought from which either 
question could be intelligibly, never mind efficaciously, 
adjudicated .... 44 
Advocates may argue for the preeminence of either the acts-oriented 
integrative, universalizing conception of sexuality, or the status-based, 
separatist, minoritizing conception. But adding to the weight of either 
discourse will not break the stalemate between them.45 The "stranglehold" 
of acts versus status, of conflicting, integrative and separatist discourses 
generates intractable incoherence. 
B. INTRACTABLE CONFLICT IN LEGAL DISCOURSE: KENNEDY'S 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONTRADICTION AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
BALANCING RULES AND STANDARDS 
Sedgwick's description of all-pervasive and irreducible integrative and 
separatist discourses parallels the sense of irreducible contradiction 
between legal standards and legal rules, altruism and individualism that 
Duncan Kennedy locates at the "center of modernist legal consciousness.',46 
K~nnedy writes in Form and Substance that opposed individualist and 
altruist conceptions of justice and separatist and integrative rhetorical 
modes pervade legal reasoning, reflecting a deep seated conceptual 
contradiction. There is no metasystem with which to resolve this 
contridiction.47 The opposed rhetorical modes reveal a deeper level of 
conflict at which ''we are divided, among ourselves and also within 
ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and 
between radically different aspirations for our common future.',48 This 
conflict is external in that it is manifested in law; it is internal in that very 
few participants in legal reasoning can avoid the sense of ascribing to both 
sides at the same time.49 
Kennedy presents two opposed rhetorical modes for discussing 
substantive issues: individualism and altruism. Kennedy describes 
individualism as the "making of a sharp distinction between one's interests 
43. /d. at 86. 
44. Id. at 86-90 (emphasis in original). 
45. Seeid. 
46. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 151-52,207-09; Kennedy, supra note 20. 
47. See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1685. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. at 1776. Despite hislher finnly held convictions, there is a point at which the 
individualist stops short of advocating for the state of nature; conversely, there is a point at 
which the altruist stops short of advocating for complete collectivism. /d. at 1767, 1774. 
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and those of others,,,50 valuing self-reliance. Individualists do not share in 
each other's gains or losses. However, individualism is not to be conflated 
with egoism - the notion that self-interest can be pursued without limit. 
Rather, individualism incorporates the idea that rules, or limits on self-
interested behavior, are acceptable to the extent that they enable 
individualists to coexist.51 
Individualism is an atomist social vision. It posits both the subjectivity 
of values, in the sense that it is impossible to verify other people's feelings 
or motivations, and the arbitrariness of values, in the sense that even if we 
could identify what values govern a particular situation, we could not 
explain why they are there and therefore cannot determine what values we 
ought to hold or strive for.52 The state in an individualist social order, then, 
is facilitative. It is an instrument the parties use to achieve their 
independently defined objectives.53 
Altruism, on the other hand, is about sharing and sacrifice.54 Sharing 
and sacrifice represent the opposite of the individualist notion of exchange 
in that they leave open the possibility of non-reciprocity, whereas the 
essence of exchange is that each party takes away something. 55 Like 
individualism's affiliation with liberalism, altruism rests largely on 
organicist premises. Altruism demands that collective ends be determined, 
and that justice be established in reference to those shared ends.56 
Individualism and altruism correlate to differing conceptions of social 
justice. 
Kennedy also presents two opposed ways of framing solutions to legal 
problems: one mode favoring highly administrable, formal rules, and the 
other favoring "equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with 
relatively little precedential value.,,57 These two modes of solving legal 
problems surface in legal arguments made by liberals and conservatives 
alike as they deploy sets of paired, opposing "argument bites" in pursuit of 
a certain outcome or rule choice that furthers their political agendas. No 
metatheory exists with which to police how judges facing a gap, conflict, or 
ambiguity in the law choose among a spectrum of available rule choices 
and corresponding sets of paired argument bites with which judges may 
justify their decisions.58 
50. Id. at 1713. 
51. Id. at 1713-15. Liberalism is not necessary to individualism, but, as Kennedy 
observes: "liberal theory has been an important component of individualism in our political 
culture at least since Hobbes." Id. at 1767. 
52. Id. at 1769. 
53. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1770. 
54. Id. at 1717. 
55. Id. at 1718. Kennedy notes that there is no way to "prove" the validity of these 
constructs. Rather, he relies on their intuitive familiarity and recognizability. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1685. 
58. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 147. 
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To align elements of Kennedy's and Sedgwick's frameworks, 
individualism can be cast as generally integrative, altruism for the most 
part as separatist. The imagery of core and periphery is a way of 
conceiving of integrative and separatist components in law. The core 
represents common law rules perceived as baseline, as traditional. 
Although legal institutions and decisions can be fit into either individualist 
or altruist molds, the dominant .values animating the common law are 
perceived to be individualist.59 So, to the extent that formal rules reflect 
individualist impulses towards self-reliance and exchange, they lie within 
the core. A legal rule that is part of the core is seen as integrated into the 
set of dominant background rules which define the values underpinning the 
legal system. Given the perceived alignment of individualism to the core, 
and of formal, rigid rules to the core, both individualism and rules can be 
described as integrative. 
From the view of the core, counter-tendencies reflecting altruist values 
appear as exceptions, as at the periphery. Kennedy writes that basic legal 
institutions that do have an obvious altruistic basis, like the progressive 
income tax, social security, or minimum wage, are viewed as "after-the-fact 
adjustments to a pre-existing legal structure that has its own, individualist, 
logical coherence.,,6o To say that a legal solution lies at the periphery of a 
core rule structure is to separate it from the dominant set of background 
norms. Given the perceived alignment of altruism to the periphery, and the 
alignment of equitable standards to the periphery, both equitable standards 
or exceptions to rigid rules and altruism can be described as separatist. 
However, there is not one coherent core of rules flanked by attendant 
appendages that form a coherent periphery of exceptions. Likewise, there 
is not one coherent core of individualist thinking delineated by a periphery 
of altruism. Rather, rules and standards, individualism and altruism, are 
poles or vectors in constant tension. Each cell in the body of common law 
rules contains elements of the core and the periphery. Each rule represents 
a solution crafted while being tugged at from both individualist and altruist 
ends. To the extent that a core of legal rules is understood to be both 
explicative of a set of dominant background norms and opposed to a 
periphery of standards, the core and periphery are interdependent. The 
intelligibility of the core depends upon the simultaneous presence of the 
periphery. 
In addition, the supposed centrality of the core and the supposed 
marginal position of the periphery are constantly unstable because the 
59. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1715-19. Kennedy states: "A very common view alike in 
the lay world and within the legal profession is that law is unequivocally the domain of 
individualism .... " !d. at 1718. He observes that the "rhetoric of individualism so 
thoroughly dominates legal discourse ... that it is difficult even to identify a counter-ethic." 
!d. at 1717. 
60. !d. at 1719. 
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periphery is constituted at once internal and external to the core.61 In this 
way, the irreducible conflict between integrative and separatist elements, 
pervades the entire body of the common law just as Sedgwick's discursive 
incoherence pervades all nodes of cultural organization. 
Further, in the same vein that Sedgwick presents her separatist and 
integrative discourses as irreconcilable, Kennedy presents the conflict 
between substantive and formal approaches to law as irresolvable. 
Whereas Sedgwick asserts that there is no standpoint from which to 
adjudicate between these discourses surrounding the notions of "the closet" 
and "coming out," Kennedy argues that there is no metasystem with which 
to adjudicate between altruism, equitable standards, individualism, or rigid 
rules approaches. The conflict between these approaches is not just 
disagreement about the best way to balance competing interests. Rather: 
The acknowledgement of contradiction means that we cannot 
"balance" individualist and altruist values or rules against equitable 
standards, except in the tautological sense that we can, as a matter 
of fact, decide if we have to. The imagery of balancing 
presupposes exactly the kind of more abstract unit of measurement 
that the sense of contradiction excludes.62 
C. SEDGWICK, KENNEDY, AND BATTERED WOMEN'S CLAIMS IN COURT 
Sedgwick's and Kennedy's frameworks can be described as parallel in 
that they both find incoherence and a lack of epistemological grounding 
from which to resolve incoherence to be the central, defining characteristic 
of the discourses with which they are most concerned. However, Sedgwick 
and Kennedy diverge in several important respects. Kennedy's argument 
aligns sets of contradictions, whereas Sedgwick's argument illustrates the 
difficulty of sustaining any such alignment. In examining the 
contradictions individualism and altruism, legal rules and standards, core 
and periphery, Kennedy posits a basic alignment of individualism, rules, 
core, and altruism, standards, periphery. Sedgwick, on the other hand, 
presents a matrix involving multiple possible alignments of various 
separatist and integrative discourses.63 Kennedy focuses primarily on 
substantive distinctions between types of legal solutions such as rules and 
standards classified as individualist or altruist, as core or periphery. 
Sedgwick focuses on the implications for sexual definition of various 
61. Cf SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 10. 
62. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1775; see also KENNEDY, supra note 15, 202-09. Though 
both Kennedy and Sedgwick present the conflicts they describe as irresolvable, they differ 
in that Kennedy does not endow his with the same sense of crisis that Sedgwick does. He 
states that presenting an irresolvable conflict among our own values may be "pessimistic, 
one might even say defeatist," but his project is to find order and meaning within the sense 
of contradiction. He seeks to show an orderliness to the myriad policy arguments that 
emerged after we stopped believing in law's neutrality. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1724. 
63. See SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 87-88. 
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substantive distinctions by classifying two levels of discourses regarding 
sexuality as either separatist or integrative. Conflicting minoritizing and 
universalizing discourses surrounding sexual defInition operate alongside 
conflicting continuum and inversion discourses surrounding gender. 
The value of demonstrating the complexity and consequences of 
intractable incoherence for feminist reform and victims of domestic 
violence does not depend upon full integration of Kennedy's and 
Sedgwick's frameworks. A complete alignment or integration of 
Kennedy's and Sedgwick's contradiction frameworks may not be possible. 
Victims of domestic violence embody the internal incoherence in 
discursive and institutional "common sense" regarding sexual defInition. 
Incoherence in women's sexual defmition is precisely what feminists such 
as Schneider and Dalton are concerned with in their critiques of using BWS 
in court. Sedgwick's work represents one of the most thorough and 
complex readings of intractable conflicts embedded in sexual defmition. 
When victims of domestic violence sue their abusers, the internal 
incoherence of legal argumentation and adjudication informs their 
possibilities for success. Kennedy's work provides a thorough and 
complex reading of intractable conflicts entrenched in legal reasoning. 
Whether Sedgwick's and Kennedy's presentations of contradiction can be 
fully integrated is not important. What matters 'is considering how, when 
victims of domestic violence sue in court, they are steeped in both sets of 
contradictions. 
This article fInds that the intractability of the incoherences presented by 
Kennedy and Sedgwick is rooted in part in the consistent alignment of 
certain contradictions, yet simultaneous impossibility of logically 
sustaining or cementing such alignment. Like a shallow but wide, slow 
current, health, capacity, rationality, individualism and core flow together, 
as do illness, incapacity, insanity, altruism, periphery. The direction of this 
flow is consistent and never wholly reversed, but just a little stir or push 
upstream disrupts the alignments. Concern for this flow of associations 
drives criticism of designating victims of domestic violence as insane or 
incapacitated. Yet, representation with concerted effort to induce favorable 
cultural associations prompts a dizzying stir of possibilities and 
implications in the complex matrix of incoherences constituting sexuality 
and gender that surround battered women. The difficulty of challenging 
the dominant direction of alignments lies in its simultaneous cultural 
salience, yet fluidity. 
For example, battered women who come out of an abusive relationship 
to sue are caught in a double bind between a universalizing discourse of 
acts (such as making a legal claim) and a minoritizing discourse of status 
(such as being incapacitated with BWS).64 In attempting to guide battered 
women in court through this double bind, Schneider argues that instead of 
64. See infra Part III. 
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pleading insanity or incapacity because of BWS, courts and litigators need 
to understand why a battered woman's actions are reasonable from her 
perspective.65 This argument is steeped in the cultural incoherence 
Sedgwick describes between inversion and continuum. Schneider's logic 
inverts the battered woman on trial from being insane to its cultural 
opposite - being rational and reasonable given her experience. Yet her 
argument requires a continuum of reasonableness along a spectrum of 
perspectives. The reasonableness of a battered woman's acts can only be 
established in relation to her status as occupying an altered perspective. 
ID. CASE ANALYSIS AND THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK IN PART II 
The incoherences described in Part II above pervade tort law claims of 
battered women against their abusers.66 Adjudication of battered women's 
claims implicates various levels of incoherence both between integrative 
and separatist cultural conceptions of domestic violence victims and among 
divergent conceptions of social justice and modes of legal reasoning 
described by Kennedy. 
The analysis below applies the contradiction framework to cases 
addressing the issue of whether the statute of limitations on assault and 
battery should be applied in cases where a woman sues her abuser after 
65. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 2; 
Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination, supra note 2. 
66. There are several procedural obstacles that must be overcome before a woman abused 
by her spouse can even sue for assault and battery (and claim exemption from the statute of 
limitations). First, the state in which her suit is filed must have abolished interspousal tort 
immunity. See Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce, supra note 2, at 
333 (arguing that although most states have formally abolished interspousaI tort immunity, 
the doctrine's legacy still imposes many obstacles on spouses who sue their abusive 
partners). Second, if the plaintiff is simultaneously divorcing her abuser, it must be decided 
whether her tort claim should be joined with any divorce proceedings. If the plaintiff 
already divorced her abuser, it must be decided whether her assault and battery claim is 
barred by res judicata. See Pena, supra note 10, at 504-05; Kohler, supra note 13, at 1030. 
Despite the widespread elimination of the doctrine of interspousaI tort immunity, the 
acceptance of testimony on BWS in criminal defense cases, and recent litigation arguing for 
a continuous tort of partner abuse, tort causes of action and recovery available to women 
who sue for personal injuries suffered during domestic violence is disappointingly limited. 
The legacy of interspousa! immunity still imposes obstacles to recovery. Expert testimony 
on BWS has proven successful at improving chances of acquittal for a defendant charged 
with murdering an abusive partner. However, it has not faired well as evidence supporting a 
continuous tort of spouse abuse. See Daniel Atkins et aI., Striving for Justice with the 
Violence Against Women Act and Civil Tort Actions, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.1. 69 (1999); 
Heather Tonsing, Note, Battered Women Syndrome as Tort Cause of Action, 12 J.L. & 
HEALTH 407,433 (1997/1998). See generally SCHNEIDER, BATIERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING, supra note 2; Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination, supra 
note 2, at 487; Stephen Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2151, 2207 (1995); Lenore Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider's 
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOl\.ffiN'S RTS. L. REp. 223,224 (1986). 
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many years of battering.67 There are several possible legal responses to the 
defense of the statute of limitations that a battered woman litigant may 
make. For example, she could claim some form of incapacity that 
precluded her from suing earlier,68 she could claim that domestic abuse is a 
continuing tort because all of the acts of abuse contributed to one sustained 
injury,69 or she could try to sue under an alternative cause of action like 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.7o Each of these causes of action 
involves hurdles to recovery arising from the mismatch between the 
contexts in which these doctrines were developed and the unique situation 
of domestic violence. 
Women who claim to suffer from BWS have used testimony about the 
syndrome to argue both (i) that BWS is evidence of incapacity or insanity 
that precluded her from suing earlier and therefore excepts her action from 
the statute oflimitations, and (ii) that BWS is evidence of the grounds for a 
continuing tort, inflicted over time, the cumulative effect of which is 
actionable.71 Cases decided to date dealing with battered women, BWS, 
67. See supra note 13; see also Atkins, supra note 66; Dalton, Domestic Violence, 
Domestic Torts and Divorce, supra note 2; Dalton, When Paradigms Collide, supra note 2; 
Lisa Napoli, Tolling the Statute o/Limitations for Survivors 0/ Domestic Violence Who Wish 
to Recover Civil Damages Against Their Abusers, 5 CIRCLES: BUFF. WOMEN'S J.L. & SOC. 
POL'y. 53 (1997); Tonsing, supra note 66. 
68. This incapacity could be presented using claims of duress, insanity, or estoppel. 
Duress requires that the defendant used coercion to prevent the plaintiff from bringing suit. 
An estoppel theory maintains that the defendant is estopped from invoking the statute of 
limitations ifhis actions caused the plaintiff's delay in bringing suit. Insanity requires proof 
of a mental defect that prevented the plaintiff from bringing suit. Despite the range of 
possible approaches, cases brought to date have focused on insanity and on a possible 
continuing tort cause of action for domestic abuse. For discussion of the range of possible 
tolls, see generally Napoli, supra note 67. 
69. Continuing torts involve a course of conduct which over a period of years caused 
damage. "Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can 
'fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm.' it seems proper to 
regard the cumulative effect ofthe conduct as actionable." Page v. U.S., 729 F.2d 818, 821-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Some examples of continuous torts are unremitting 
trespass, continuous negligent representation by an attorney, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
70. Courts have been very reluctant to uphold claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in a domestic context. Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires 
that the plaintiff establish the "outrageousness" of the defendant's conduct. Courts tend to 
hold acts between spouses to a higher standard of outrageousness than between strangers. 
See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a suing 
spouse must meet a higher standard of the element of "outrageousness" in order to recover 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Hakkila cites RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS section 895F cmt. h (1965), which states that the intimacies of family life involve 
intended physical contacts that would be actionable between strangers. Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 
1323. However, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as a continuing tort between spouses. Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 753-
54 (Idaho 1993). 
71. See Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce, supra note 2, at 344-45 
(explaining that because the statute oflimitations bars recovery for so much domestic abuse, 
feminist scholars and litigators have argued both for allowing plaintiffs who have BWS to 
sue beyond the prescription period and for a new continuing tort of ''partner abuse" to allow 
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and the statute of limitations create a somewhat confusing maze of legal 
claims and judicial responses. This section summarizes these cases and 
then uses the contradiction framework to analyze what they mean for 
feminist reform. 
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON ASSAULT 
AND BATTERY 
Cases addressing whether to toll the statute of limitations for claimants 
who sue for assault and battery in a domestic context have focused on the 
toll for insanity and the toll for a continuing tort. Insanity means that the 
claimant could not sue within the prescription period because of some 
mental defect. "A 'continuing tort' is one inflicted over a period of time; it 
involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day 
creates a separate cause of action."n Insanity and continuing torts are both 
well established exceptions to the statute oflimitations. 
The most prominent and promising case exempting a plaintiff with 
BWS from the statute of limitations on assault and battery is the New 
Jersey case Giovine v. Giovine.73 Giovine held that if a plaintiff establishes 
by expert testimony that she suffers from BWS, then she may seek 
recovery for all abusive acts that contributed to development of her 
syndrome regardless of the statute of limitations on assault and battery.74 
The grounds that Giovine offered for its holding included both that a 
claimant suffering from BWS can be likened to an insane plaintiff, and also 
that the acts causing BWS constitute a continuing tort. 
In holding that BWS is an exception to the statute of limitations, the 
majority opinion in Giovine likened BWS to insanity. The court stated that 
"[o]ne common characteristic of battered woman's syndrome is 
'psychological paralysis,' the inability of the victim 'to take any action at 
all to improve or alter the situation. ",75 The court relied on a case in which 
the New Jersey Supreme Court tolled the statute of limitations because the 
defendant had caused the plaintiff to become insane. The Giovine court 
stated that the standard for whether the statute of limitations should be 
tolled for a plaintiff with BWS was the same as the standard for insane 
plaintiffs.76 
Giovine built upon Cusseaux v. Pickett,17 which held: "Because the 
battered woman's syndrome is the result of a continuing pattern of abuse 
and violent behavior that causes continuing damage, it must be treated in 
an entire history of violence and emotional cruelty to be presented under a single claim). 
72. 54 C.J.S. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 177 (1987) (citations omitted). 
73. 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), overruled on other grounds by 
Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667, 674 (N.J. 1996). 
74. !d. 
75. !d. at 118 (quoting State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984)). 
76. !d. at 115 (citing Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc. 207 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1965)). 
77. 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. 1994). 
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the same way as a continuing tort.,,78 The Cusseaux opinion substituted 
BWS itself for the tortious conduct that resulted in BWS. In distinguishing 
Giovine from Cusseaux, the Giovine court clarified that it was the 
underlying tortious conduct, not BWS itself, that constituted a continuing 
tort. The Giovine court stated: "We do not adopt the conclusion in 
Cusseaux that battered woman's syndrome is itself a continuous tort. 
Battered woman's syndrome is more correctly the medical condition 
resulting from continued acts of physical or psychological misconduct.,,79 
The court continued: ''To overcome the statute of limitations, it is 
imperative that the tortious conduct giving rise to the medical condition be 
considered a continuous tort.',so 
Though Giovine implied a new continuing tort, it did not adequately 
explain the evidentiary standards for establishing elements of that tort. The 
Giovine court held it is the plaintiff's burden to show by expert medical, 
psychiatric or psychological testimony that she suffers from BWS which 
caused her inability to file suit earlier.8l However, Giovine was not clear 
on whether it is just the syndrome or the syndrome plus tortious acts 
inducing the syndrome that the plaintiff must prove. Judge Skillman's 
dissent in Giovine was concerned with this problem. If a claimant can 
establish an exception to the statute of limitations by proving the fact of the 
syndrome, along with the inducing acts that are not independently tortious, 
then indirect liability has been created for a wide variety of the defendant's 
prior acts that are not and should not be considered tortious. 
Though Giovine and Cusseaux appear promising, they leave much 
confusion over the nature of the continuing tort claim that they established. 
Also, these cases are flanked by cases expressly rejecting claims to toll the 
statute of limitations on the grounds that domestic abuse can be considered 
a continuing tort and rejecting claims that BWS produces insanity 
warranting a toll of the statute of limitations. Many battered women 
suffering from BWS do not fit legal definitions of insanity because they 
often continue to function in society and exhibit rational behavior during 
the course ofthe abusive relationship. In New York, for example, the legal 
standard for insanity warranting a toll of the statute of limitations is 
inability "to protect. .. legal rights because of an over-all inability to 
function in society."s2 
78. Id. at 794. 
79. 663 A.2d at 115. 
80. Id. The Giovine court reaffinned the Cusseaux four part test, establishing the 
continuing tort of domestic abuse: 1) involvement in a marital or marital-like intimate 
relationship; and 2) physical or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant partner to 
the relationship over an extended period of time; and 3) the aforestated abuse has caused 
recurring physical or psychological injury over the course of the relationship; and 4) a past 
or present inability to take any action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally. Id. at 
114. 
81. Id. at 117. 
82. See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 435 N.E. 2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1980). 
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The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in Laughlin v. Breaux,83 
rejected the claim that BWS is evidence of incapacity sufficient to toll the 
prescription period. The plaintiff in Laughlin pled that prescription should 
not preclude her from damages for years of abuse using the doctrine of 
contra non valentum.84 She contended that BWS made her unable to file 
SUit.85 The plaintiff's doctor testified that the plaintiff suffered from 
"learned helplessness" as a result of BWS and that this symptom prevented 
her from taking legal action.86 The court found that the plaintiff in 
Laughlin did establish by expert testimony that she suffered from BWS. 
But because she exhibited rational, self-sufficient behavior while the abuse 
was going on - she ran her own business, talked about the abuse with 
friends, and once called the police - she could not establish that her 
situation warranted exception for insanity to the statute oflimitations.87 
The Laughlin court also held that domestic abuse that causes BWS is 
not a continuing tort. The court summarily stated: "The principle of a 
continuing tort only applies when continuous conduct causes continuing 
damages .... In this action each incident of battery and assault is separate, 
and gives rise to a separate cause of action.',88 The court referenced 
testimony from witnesses describing multiple instances of abuse and the 
obvious physical injuries the plaintiff sustained from each incident.89 Then, 
in explaining its holding, the court offered a statement of Louisiana 
doctrine regarding prescription and cited Louisiana precedent on point: 
"Prescription runs from the date damages are sustained; damages are 
sustained from the date the injury is inflicted if they are immediately 
apparent to the victim, even though the extent of the damages may not be 
known.,,90 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Davis v. Bostic/t1 
overturned the lower court's decision rejecting a statute of limitations 
defense on the grounds that defendant's violent abuse of the plaintiff over 
several years constituted a continuing tort. The court acknowledged that 
''there can be no doubt that defendant's abusive behavior was all of a piece 
in intent and content without substantial letup for three years and with 
almost diabolical variety.,,92 However, the court refused to permit the 
plaintiff to recover for the acts suffered more than two years prior to suit 
because specific events of abuse (namely that defendant struck and broke 
the plaintiff's nose and that defendant made death threats to the plaintiff) 
83. 515 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 




88. Id. (emphasis in original). 
89. Laughlin v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480,483 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
90. Id. at 482. 
91. 580 P .2d 544, 548 (Or. 1978). 
92. Id. at 547. 
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were separately actionable.93 Unlike the Laughlin court, the court in Davis 
found that there were no authoritative precedents "squarely raising the 
point here,,94 because of the context of abuse in which the separately 
actionable incidents occurred. Dicta in the Davis opinion condemned the 
defendant's reprehensible behavior, but ultimately the court feared that 
were the plaintiff permitted to "ride out the storm and lump sum her 
grievances,,9S the court could not "see where the relation back would end in 
this sort of case.,,96 
B. CONTRADICTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GIOVINE OPINION FOR 
FEMINIST REFORM 
This section uses the contradiction framework to analyze implications 
of the Giovine opinion for feminist reform. From a cultural standpoint, in 
coming out of an abusive relationship to sue her abuser, a battered woman 
is steeped in incoherence surrounding the crisis of sexual definition 
described by Sedgwick. From a legal standpoint, if she seeks recovery for 
abuse beyond the prescription period on assault and battery, her claim 
embodies the adjudicative quagmire described by Kennedy. Part N below 
discusses the consequences of this complexity: that contradicting 
implications for women present in both legal and cultural discourses enable 
a privilege of ignorance that undermines the progressive potential of 
educating judges. 
Feminist writers (including Schneider, Dalton, and Napoli) have 
expressed serious concern about negative, minoritizing implications for 
women claiming insanity and using BWS as evidence of incapacity.97 In 
93. Id. at 544-45, 548. 
94. Id. at 547. 
95. Id. at 548. 
96. Id. 
97. Battered women's advocate Elizabeth Schneider observes that cases involving 
testimony on BWS resound with the stereotypes of incapacity they were meant to overcome. 
See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 2; Schneider, 
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work, supra note 2, at 197. (Although 
most of Schneider's work is about representing battered women who have killed their 
abusers, her critique is also relevant to representing battered women as plaintiffs in tort suits 
against their abusers.) Similarly, Lisa Napoli writes, 
If it is argued that a person who has been battered is 'insane,' then she or he 
is placed in a position of weakness and of being in need of protection. While 
women may prevail using this argument, insanity may not be the best option 
since it feeds into the stereotype that women are helpless and cannot fend for 
themselves. 
Napoli, supra note 67, at 60. See generally Abrams, supra note 14; Naomi Cahn & Joan 
Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. 
PUB. INT. 1.J. 339 (1995); Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce, supra 
note 2, at 333; Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: 
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGALF. 23; Martha R. Mahoney, 
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. 1. REv. 1 
(1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist 
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992), 
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addition, Schneider expresses sensitivity to potential stigma for women 
associated with novel causes of action or "special pleading.,,98 Use of 
testimony on battering can be socially integrative or universalizing for 
women when it contributes to an understanding of their actions as 
reasonable. But such testimony can be at the same time minoritizing or 
separatist for women in that it locates them within a specific minority 
suffering from negative psychological effects of battering, described as ill 
or as victims. Schneider responds to this dilemma by arguing that courts 
and litigators need to understand domestic violence better so that they can 
see how a battered woman's seemingly irrational behavior is not insane, 
but in fact reasonable given her situation.99 Her response pits an integrative 
strategy of describing battered women as reasonable against the separatist, 
peripheral move to establish a continuum of reasonableness along differing 
perspectives. The integrative power of categorizing battered women's 
actions as reasonable is in conflict with the separatist fracturing of 
reasonableness. Schneider's solution may well be the best possible way to 
represent battered women. This critique is meant to highlight its 
complexity and its potential consequences as it responds to the complexity 
and consequences of presenting battered women as incapacitated. 
Schneider's approach marks one interface between the contradictions of 
health and illness, and core and periphery discussed below. 
1. Contradiction: Health and lllness 
Giovine and Cusseaux allow battered women to recover damages for 
years of abuse, but claiming BWS as grounds for a tort to toll the statute of 
limitations places battered women in the minoritizing discourse of the 
"syndrome" (a status that results from acts of a particular nature such as 
assault and battery over the course of a long relationship). Recognizing 
BWS as the basis for an affirmative tort separates women who have this 
syndrome from the general class of claimants for assault and battery who 
must file suit within the statute of limitations. Women plaintiffs in this 
situation are permitted to sue for acts beyond the prescription period not 
because the courts recognize abusers' tortious conduct as a coherent, long-
98. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
99. Schneider's work focuses on criminal defense of battered women who kill or attack 
their abusers (in self defense). She has worked to show why it is reasonable (given threats 
of violence and behavior of abusers) for a woman to stay in an abusive relationship or to act 
in self defense in a way that may not look reasonable to judges or litigators who are 
unfamiliar \vith domestic violence. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING, supra note 2, at 222. Her concerns about representing battered women as sick 
or incapacitated (as opposed to reasonable) are applicable in a civil case context as welL 
This article does not address the possible relationships between development of a criminal 
law doctrine in which battered women defendants who stay in abusive relationships or kill 
their abusers are seen as reasonable and a tort law doctrine allowing battered women to sue 
for damages beyond prescription periods. However, given the Laughlin and Davis 
decisions, casting battered women defendants as reasonable might undermine efforts to help 
such claimants avoid prescription in civil cases. See, e.g., text accompanying note 102. 
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standing infliction of abuse, but because courts find that such plaintiffs 
were not of able enough mind to sue earlier. 
The Giovine l court's focus on the incapacitating effects of BWS 
separates out claimants who use this diagnosis to avoid having their 
recovery limited to abuse which occurred the last two years from the 
standard, able claimant who would be subjected to the statute oflimitations 
for the same acts of assault and battery. This approach subjects battered 
women to the minoritizing status of being sick or insane because of 
continuing abuse. 
Conversely, holding a plaintiff suing for domestic violence to the 
statute of limitations on assault and battery places such plaintiff in a 
universalizing discourse of acts and rationality. It implies that the acts of 
assault and battery she suffered are just like any other, and that she is able-
minded and therefore must bring suit within two years to recover for them. 
For example, Judge Skillman's dissenting opinion in Giovine stated: 
Any person who is a victim of violence, or the threat of violence, 
may recover money damages for assault andlor battery .... 
Consequently, any woman who is the victim of an act of battering, 
or a threat of battering, can bring a tort action against her assailant 
for each ofthose acts. 100 
Judge Skillman emphasized that domestic violence was actionable just 
like other acts of violence, and that the plaintiff did not claim insanity, nor 
was she incapacitated or prevented by her physical or mental trauma from 
pursuing her rightS.101 He stated that the law has already determined under 
what circumstances accrual of a cause of action may be postponed, and 
since this plaintiff's situation was not one of the established circumstances, 
she must be treated like any other c1aimant.102 He found no reason why 
existing causes of action were not sufficient to compensate for the harm 
alleged, and saw no reason why a woman with BWS needed special 
accommodation respecting the statute oflimitations.103 Skillman's opinion 
implied the existence of a baseline, or standard, plaintiff who is reasonable 
and ready to pursue her rights within two years of assault and battery. His 
opinion was socially integrative for battered women to the extent that it 
incorporates them into this class of reasonable, able plaintiffs - those who 
have capacity to bring suit within the statute oflimitations. 
The court in Laughlin took an approach similar to Skillman's. In 
supporting its finding that the plaintiff was not sufficiently incapacitated to 
bring suit earlier and that domestic violence is not a continuous tort, the 
court noted that during the abusive relationship the plaintiff ran her -own 
business, talked about the abuse with friends and with the defendant, had 
100. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 125 (Skillman, JAD., dissenting) 
101. ld. at 125,129. 
102. ld. at 127~28. 
103. ld. at 125~27. 
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once called the police after an abusive incident, and saw a psychologist in 
order to deal with her abuse.104 The opinion implied that there is nothing 
about the syndrome itself that makes battered women plaintiffs incapable 
of filing suit, that separates them out of the standard class of claimants. 
Battered women plaintiffs are caught between an integrative discourse 
of health or capacity to bring suit and a separatist discourse of illness or 
incapacity. If they act in their defense during an abusive relationship by 
seeking divorce or counseling, they are not considered sufficiently sick to 
warrant exception to the statute of limitations. The law commands them 
not to take action that displays capacity to_ bring suit before actually 
bringing suit. To recover for abuse beyond the prescription period, they 
must prove themselves to be sufficiently insane. 
2. Contradiction: Core and Periphery 
The statute of limitations is a highly administrable, rigid rule. Barring 
recovery to battered women for any violent incident that occurred more that 
two years prior to the suit is individualist in its reification of the idea of the 
rational, independent claimant, capable of pursuing her rights promptly. A 
common law rule that tolls the statute of limitations for women who 
establish that they have battered woman syndrome can be understood as 
minoritizing not only because of its implication that battered women 
plaintiffs are sick and victims, but also because of its status as an equitable 
exception to the statute oflimitations rule, as periphery. 
Schneider asserts a relationship between claims which are viewed as 
exceptions to the core of common law rules and stigmatization. She 
laments the law's use of BWS as an exception to the traditional defense 
doctrine, as "special pleading,,,I05 arguing that when battered women's 
claims are "perceived to be outside the traditional justification framework," 
then "gender bias is not only neither addressed nor remedied, but 
exacerbated."lo6 Legal rules assume a prototypical legal subject capable of 
abiding by them. The statute of limitations assumes that a typical person 
can bring suit within two years of being assaulted. If someone is assaulted 
and does not sue within two years, then she either made a decision to 
forego legal action, or she not a prototypical legal claimant (because she 
lacks mental capacity or otherwise). 
Quoting from Davis the dissenting opinion in Giovine stated: 
"'Designating a series of discrete acts, even if connected in design or 
intent, a continuing tort ought not to be a rationale by which the statute of 
104. Laughlin v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480,482 (La. Ct. App. 1987); see also, Evan Stark, 
Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 
ALB. L. REv. 973, 992, 994-95 (1995) (illustrating that a woman's aggressive behavior in 
court is inconsistent with that of the stereotypical passive victim). 
105. Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination, supra note 2, at 492,512. 
106. ld. at 492. 
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limitations policy can be avoided.",101 This statement suggested two levels 
of core and periphery designation. First, the statute of limitations is a core 
rule that must be protected from an encroaching periphery of exceptions 
an ever growing list of continuing torts. At the same time, the continuing 
tort itself is a core or traditional exception to the statute of limitations 
which Skillman perceives as threatened by claimants who want to take a 
series of discrete acts, like batterings that occurred over the conrse of a 
marriage, and lump them together to establish a continuing tort. 
The exception or periphery only has meaning in conjunction with the 
rule or the core. ill fact, the exception can even be said to effectuate the 
rule. S0ren Kierkegaard (as quoted by Carl Schmitt) writes: "If 
[exceptions] cannot be explained, then neither can the general be explained. 
Usually the difficulty is not noticed, since the general is thought about not 
with passion but only with comfortable superficiality. The exception, on 
the other hand, thinks the general with intense passion.,,108 
Skillman defined the periphery by contrasting claims he deemed 
marginal to those he deemed established. The established exceptions to the 
statute of limitations become core as they appeared in contrast to more 
marginal claims in question. ill arguing that there was no need for a new 
cause of action for BWS, the dissent cast established exceptions - insanity 
and the idea of the continuing tort - as belonging to a core of acceptable 
exceptions that should not be eroded. Skillman wrote: "A party who seeks 
to avoid the bar of a statute of limitations by invocation of the discovery 
rule or other comparable doctrine has the bnrden of proof.,,109 ill other 
words, the discovery rule, which states that a cause of action for injury 
accrues when the harm is or could have been discovered, is an acceptable, 
core exception to the statute of limitations. Skillman's assertion that 
battered women must establish either insanity or allege a continuous tort 
(which he says they do not) suggests that insanity and continuing torts 
count as "other comparable doctrines." 
IV. THE PRIVILEGE OF IGNORANCE, THE RULE OF LAW, 
AND EXPECTATIONS OF COMMON LAW REFORM 
THROUGH ENLIGHTENMENT 
Adjudicators, such as Skillman in the sample case analysis above, 
lament the expansion of a periphery of exceptions, yet simultaneously 
endorse the ground that exceptions have laid so far. 11 0 Courts have not 
generated established exceptions for women who cannot sue within the 
107. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A,2d at 109, 129 (Skillman, JAD., dissenting) (quoting 
Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544,548 (Or. 1978». 
108. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CoNCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 22 (1922), quoted in GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER 
AND BARE LIFE 16 (Daniel Heller~Roazen trans., 1998) (1995). 
109. Giovine, 663 A,2d at 128 (Skillman, J.A.D., dissenting). 
110. See supra note 25 (regarding the set of adjudicative acts targeted in this argument). 
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statute of limitations on assault and battery because of circumstances 
surrounding abuse. Yet, exceptions facilitate the meaning and 
administration of rules. This paradox has lead feminists such as Schneider, 
West, and Dalton to target ignorance as the source of judicial resistance to 
establishing such exceptions, and to call for education or enlightenment to 
effectuate reform. 
The intellectual developments exemplified by Sedgwick's and 
Kennedy's work happened alongside proliferation of this predominant 
mode of feminist thinking that aligns and even equates enlightenment with 
progressive developments in common law. Feminists appeal to the power 
of knowledge, but from Sedgwick's and Kennedy's view, context and 
understanding are fractured along multiple incoherences - between 
minoritizing and universalizing cultural impulses, between individualist 
and altruist conceptions of justice, between separatist and integrative 
modes of legal reasoning - that cause disjuncture between enlightenment 
and progress. 
This section critiques assumptions underpinning Schneider'S, West's, 
and Dalton's belief in the progressive potential of educating legal actors to 
assist strategic thinking about what can be expected of current reform 
efforts. Causing adjudicators to produce developments favorable to 
battered women through increased awareness is more complex than 
pushing against a mountain of mainstream interest in a pacific, patriarchal 
yet egalitarian view of male-female relations. Intractable contradictions 
obviate any standpoint from which to police or assess how courts respond 
to demands for, on the one hand, institutional authority, fidelity to 
precedent, and potential to articulate any social justice, versus, on the other 
hand, exceptions, risk of personal and institutional authority, and more 
transformative visions of social justice. 
A. SCHNEIDER'S, WEST'S, AND DALTON'S APPEALS TO ENLIGHTENMENT 
OF LEGAL ACTORS 
Schneider, West, and Dalton may be well aware of their assumptions 
and of the severely limited conditions under which enlightening judges can 
produce progressive law. This article focuses on their writings precisely 
because they express sensitivity to the complexity of linking awareness of 
domestic violence, favorable or progressive views of battered women, and 
doctrines that can assist those women. Their writings share a respect for 
both the difficulty of effectively raising consciousness and the complex 
effects of various representations of battered women. Yet, after 
acknowledging difficulty and complexity, all three repeatedly strike the 
same chord sounding faith in the idea that if adjudicators could only see the 
situation through their eyes, progress in the common law would follow. 
When they strike this chord, it resonates loudly against the backdrop of 
broad, common sense, consciousness-raising strategies that have fueled 
other feminist projects. This article does not address the prospects of 
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education as a strategy for other types of social or cultural reform (or even 
legislative reform). It considers how intractable contradictions and courts' 
privileged ignorance create an impasse between consciousness raising and 
progressive common law developments. 
Schneider targets courts' ignorance of battered women's experiences as 
the main reason for the persistence of legal obstacles to women's equality 
in court. Schneider asks: "How do we translate women's experiences 
honestly to courts without falling into extremes of victimization or fault 
that can be misheard?,,111 She calls for presentation of battered women as 
victims, actors and survivors, for a "fuller description of battered women's 
experiences" that "better explains to judges and juries why a battered 
woman doesn't leave the house and why she kills to save her own life.,,112 
Her recommendation implies that a more complete understanding of 
battered women's experiences on the part of the courts will advance 
women's equality through the legal system. 
Similarly, West writes that "legal culture has committed a perceptual 
error ... in failing to understanding the difference ... of our subjective, 
hedonic lives,,,I13 and implies that more accurate understanding of 
women's subjective experiences would produce feminist legal reform. 114 
West describes a failure of legal professionals to pursue a humanistic 
conception of justice based on greater awareness of women's perspectives: 
-In an oft-quoted aside, Justice Holmes once remarked that when 
lawyers in his courtroom make appeal to justice, he stops listening: 
such appeals do nothing but signal that the lawyer has neither the 
facts nor the law on his side, or worse, that he is ignorant of 
whatever law might be relevant. Holmes's remark has not gone 
unheeded. Wary of seeming ignorant or without argument, legal 
scholars, legal educators, lawyers and judges have apparently 
chosen to forego the task of articulating concepts of justice that 
might enlighten or guide the work of adjudication. I 15 
West's reaction to Holmes's comment presumes that the common law 
can and should animate a substantive vision of justice. West argues that if 
judges were sufficiently enlightened regarding women's particular hedonic 
lives and needs, the common law could develop a feminist vision of justice 
in which recovery is granted for harms suffered mainly by women. 
111. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work, supra note 2, at 
200. 
112. Id. at 222. 
113. See West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 2, at 153. 
114. See id.; see also West, Towards Humanistic Theories of Legal Justice, supra note 2. 
115. See- West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 2, at 147. West 
acknowledges that conceptions of justice as wealth maximizing (exemplified by Richard 
Posner) and justice as law itself (exemplified by Ronald Dworkin) have been offered to both 
explain and guide adjudication, but states that they "have failed to persuade all but a few of 
us." Id. at 148. Therefore, more humanistic modes of justice should be pursued. 
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Yet, fear on the part of lawyers and judges of looking "ignorant or 
without legal argument" is the reason she offers for why legal professionals 
do not base their arguments on a humanistic vision of justice. Lawyers and 
judges who might otherwise base their arguments on a conception of justice 
that incorporates knowledge of women's situations avoid doing so out of 
fear of seeming "ignorant." What do they know about legal argumentation 
that creates fear of looking ignorant if they argue based on knowledge 
about women's hedonic lives? West does not address the fundamental 
question of what facets of our common law system mandate that legal 
arguments command authority in terms of precedent rather then in terms of 
social justice. She side-steps the bind between transcendent justice and its 
inextricable opposite, law as compulsion of the text. 116 
Clare Dalton also espouses education regarding domestic violence as a 
means to reform, and yet struggles with the complexity of imparting 
knowledge to legal professionals to alter their practices. ll7 Dalton writes 
the following about training sessions designed to educate professionals 
involved with the family court system about partner violence: 
[T]hese training sessions are too often ineffective in changing 
professional practice. In part, this follows from the . . . problem 
[that] as long as competing literatures and bodies of research 
advocate competing norms and practices, responsible professionals 
can still adhere to the set that was more thoroughly and deeply 
embedded in their earlier professional training and orientation to 
their work. llS 
Dalton writes specifically of training sessions designed for 
professionals involved with the family court system, but her observations 
are apt to describe the difficulty of reforming common law adjudicators' 
behavior. The training she speaks of is training based on current 
developments in research on the subject about the nature and effects of 
partner abuse. After stating that professionals can adhere to competing 
views on domestic violence that more closely resonate with their prior 
training, Dalton writes that training sessions "often fail to take the critical 
step of helping or challenging professionals to look at their cases through 
new eyes and to use their new learning to discover -.and address abuse-
related issues that previously escaped their attention."ll9 Though 
competing literature and long-standing professional practices exist, if 
'- educational efforts regarding domestic violence simply were better or went 
further, she implies, education would induce professionals to create better 
outcomes in the family court system. 
116. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 208. 
117. See Dalton, When Paradigms Collide, supra note 2. 
118. Id. at 274. 
119. Id. 
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B. THE PRIVILEGE OF IGNORANCE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF LINKING 
AWARENESS AND COMMON LAW REFORM 
Sedgwick warns that "the angles from view from which it can look as 
though a political fight is a fight against ignorance are invigorating ... but 
a dangerous place for dwelling."I2o Ignorance on the part of courts does 
not represent "pieces of the originary dark."I2I Rather, ignorance 
corresponds to and is produced by various, particular knowledge. 
Sedgwick writes of an "epistemological privilege of ignorance" created by 
the facts that silence is as performative as speech, that ignorance colludes 
with knowledge in mobilizing goods and persons, and that the party with 
the less knowledgeable understanding of interpretive practice often defines 
the terms of exchange. 122 For example, drawing on Catherine MacKinnon, 
Sedgwick points out that "the epistemological asymmetry of the laws that 
govern rape privilege at the same time men and ignorance, inasmuch as it 
matters not at all what the raped woman perceived or wants just so .long as 
the man raping her can claim not to have noticed.,,123 Courts' privilege of 
ignorance regarding battered women is epistemological both because it 
stems from the nature of judges' knowledge of courts' institutional 
demands, and because it relates to cultural understanding of domestic 
violence. 
1. Intractable Incoherence and Schneider's, West's and Dalton's Appeals 
to Education 
Doctrine declining to remedy domestic violence seems to simply co-
exist with cultural awareness, feminist-consciousness raising efforts and 
statutes against such violence. In calling for awareness or understanding as 
a basis for common law reform, Schneider, West and Dalton seek the very 
vantage point from which to reconcile intractable conflicts that discursive 
contradictions obviate. From Sedgwick's and Kennedy's points of view, 
no grounding exists from which to resolve the incoherence between 
presenting battered women in terms of an integrative discourse of acts, 
health, or legal core, or in terms of a separatist discourse of status, illness or 
legal periphery. 
Schneider observes this problem first hand with respect to courts' use 
of expert testimony on battered women defendants in criminal cases: 
The court ... accords a woman's experience a group based 
"public" dimension rather than merely an individual, "private" 
subjective one. At the same time, perhaps it is not surprising that 
the content of what is deemed "objective" is an image of a 
120. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 7. 
121. Jd. at 8. 
122. Id. at 8-9. See also, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Privilege of Unknowing, Genders, 
No.1 (Spring 1988) 102-24. 
123. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
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victimized, passive battered woman. Perhaps this is the reason the 
court sees it as objective and acceptable.124 
Schneider's argument harkens back to Sedgwick's critical point that 
'''the phenomenon of the 'open-secret' does not, as one might think, bring 
about the collapse of those binarisms and their ideological effects, but 
rather attests to their fantasmatic recovery.',,12S Coming out of an abusive 
relationship to sue one's abuser does not challenge the binarisms private 
and public, health and illness, or active and passive, that shape 
understanding of battered women. To the contrary, it re-asserts the salience 
of these pairings. Courts maintain an epistemological privilege of 
ignorance by demanding to be educated in terms intelligible to the legal 
system, such as expert testimony on a syndrome that forms the basis for 
analogies of battered women's claims to previously established claims. 
Any knowledge imparted to educate judges about the social realities that 
victims of domestic abuse face is complicated by this set of binarisms and 
fractured by the intractable conflicts in consciousness such binarisms 
reflect. 
Intractable contradictions operate in lawsuits between impulses 
towards rules or standards, towards separatist or integrative social 
implications. If there is no metatheory with which to adjudicate between 
modes of reasoning in intractable conflict, then there is no way to police 
adjudicators' constant slippage between inconsistent modes of reasoning 
and between discourses surrounding battered women that have 
contradictory ideological effects. The impossibility of differentiating 
among positions maintained for sake of the common law's legitimacy and 
positions maintained to preserve a relation of domination between men and 
women, or courts and victims of domestic violence, preserves the position 
of ignorance. Because the intractability of contradictions makes efforts to 
preserve institutional authority indistinguishable from efforts to continue 
the disadvantage of women, fundamental contradictions enable a privileged 
ignorance that cannot be erased through enlightenment. 
In the case of common law judges, the prior norms and practices 
embedded in the professional orientation Dalton speaks of include not only 
norms for responding to domestic violence, but also complex, deep-rooted 
norms for responding to legal claims in relation to precedent, for making 
certain presumptions about the objectives and capacity of claimants, and 
for protecting courts' institutional authority through adherence to these 
norms. In cases where a litigant claims exception (because of abuse) to an 
established common law rule (like the statute of limitations), the authority 
of precedent and of an individual judge's rulings relies on conformity with 
124. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work, supra note 2, at 
220. 
125. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at 67 (quoting D.A. MILLER, THE NOVEL AND THE POLICE 
207 (1989)). 
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the nonns and practices that do not offer an effective remedy for domestic 
violence. Linking enlightenment successfully to reform at common law 
would require alignment of interpretive fidelity and women's interests -
proximity between law as compulsion of the text and social justice for 
victims of domestic violence. Even the most thorough education of judges 
on the nature and effects of domestic abuse funnels into this quagmire of 
pre-existing personal and institutional lmowledge, of discursive demands 
that makes the results of Dalton's prescription of "helping or challenging 
[judges] to look at their cases through new eyes,,126 deeply uncertain. 
West states that "legal culture has committed a perceptual error.,,127 
She personifies legal culture. She imagines it as a collective of legal actors 
who can be educated to erase the perceptual error and reform the law. But 
the perceptual error West observes is not simply made by legal actors who 
can be educated to avoid the error. Rather, a perceptual error constitutes 
legal culture. There is not a legal culture to be educated separate from legal 
discourse developed with and through the perceptual error. There is not 
sufficient distance between legal culture, legal- discourse and long-standing 
perceptual error to insert corrective education. In their professional 
capacity, legal actors are individuals constituted by legal discourse-that 
necessarily favors appeals to precedent in perpetuation of an abstract rule 
of law over appeals to substantive justice. Even (or especially) the visions 
of justice to which West aspires require abstract rules of law for 
effectuation and enforcement. 
2~ Objection and Response: Constraints on the Margin of Feminist 
Adjudicators 
An objection could be raised that privileged ignorance of domestic 
violence is fueled simply by strong, mainstream interest in representing 
male-female relations as pacific, friendly, and patriarchal, with abuse as an 
exception that is pathological. Demand for an exception to the statute of 
limitations for battered women threatens the dominant view of male-female 
relations because such a doctrinal development would force recognition of 
unwanted lmowledge, piercing denial. This interest explains choices 
adjudicators make within malleable, contradictory, two-sided legal rhetoric. 
Judges from the feminist margin who oppose this view of male-female 
relations and reject privileged ignorance of domestic violence could 
obviously choose to side with argumentative tropes favorable to battered 
women. Therefore, raising awareness of domestic violence to recruit more 
adjudicators to this feminist margin must be a fruitful strategy. 
This section r~sponds to this line of objection. The choice of judges 
from the feminist margin to rule based on the ~gumentative trope before 
them that favors a battered woman claimant is constrained in that the 
126. Dalton, When Paradigms Collide, supra note 2, at 274. 
127. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 2, at 153. 
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interests that are threatened by demand for pro-feminist exceptions to 
current doctrine are more expansive than just interest in a certain view of 
male-female relations. Feminist judges are caught between the progressive 
potential of a single decision, and protecting individual and institutional 
capacity to generate and administer sustainable rules-a capacity essential 
to any reform effort, to feminist judges' ability to protect the disadvantaged 
and punish their abusers. 
On the one hand, the most that a feminist adjudicator can do is rule 
based on one side of paired argumentative tropes applicable to any given 
issue where she finds that existing legal rules (or established exceptions) 
are not determinative. The argumentative tropes offered in a case are 
generated in response to precedents with sufficient proximity to applicable 
doctrine, and therefore, in many cases have only limited, questionable, and 
sometimes reactionary effects. The application of one solution must be 
better for battered women than application of the other solution. The 
discussion in Parts II and III above of contradictions pervading tort claims 
of battered women demonstrates the complexity of establishing this 
condition. 
On the other hand, interest in the ability of legal discourse to denounce 
one of two, paired argumentative tropes by supporting its correlative with 
appeal to an abstract rule of law must be held by the feminist margin 
because no common law reform is possible without sustained belief in a 
rule of law to effectuate it. As Holmes's quotation and West's response 
above show, an argument supported by appeal to substantive justice and an 
argument supported by appeal to precedent do not have equal weight. A 
solution that can be supported with rhetoric of fidelity to a rule of law is 
necessarily more privileged than a solution supported with rhetoric of 
substantive justice because all visions of substantive justice require 
enforcement. 
The myth of the rule of law sustains the possibility of substantive 
justice as an external referent to which legal actors can appeal. Courts 
must harbor their privileged ignorance of deeply pervasive social injustice 
towards women because courts' potential to have a relation to social justice 
depends on proximity between adherence to an abstract rule of law and the 
visions of justice courts can realize. Ignorance of social problems or of 
injustice helps to mask the elusiveness of abstract rules. Courts' privileged 
ignorance regarding pervasive violence against women can be viewed as 
vital to the maintenance of their institutional authority. 
The open secret of domestic violence continues to co-exist with public 
condemnation of such violence by feminists, legislators, and others. The 
open secret that an objective rule of law is socially constructed128 by tools 
128. Kennedy writes of anxiety surrounding the idea of the lack of an objective rule of law 
evidenced by denial (by judges and by the public at large) of the possibility that it may not 
exist. "We call it denial when we have the idea that if the speaker recognized the truth 
about an external fact, or about his own desire, emotion, opinion, or intention, he would 
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that preserve a status quo involving domination of men over women co-
exists with the requirement that law be both transcendent justice and 
fidelity to precedent. The abstract rule of law's simultaneous 
indispensability129 and susceptibility to deconstruction fuels social and 
institutional need for the "secret" component surrounding not only the rule 
of law itself, but also injustices to women such abstraction fails to remedy. 
experience painful anxiety." KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 193. Kennedy finds it common 
lmowledge that the naive view of an objective rule of law - administered independently 
from judges' subjective motives - is a myth. Id. at 192. Yet, the public and judges 
themselves maintain a hopeful fantasy that adjudicators can both articulate and dispense 
transcendent social justice and also assign the "correct" legal answer in disputes between 
particular parties. See id. at 207-09. Kennedy continues: "The speaker resolves the 
[anxiety-producing] conflict and dispels the anxiety by 'falsely' getting rid of one of the two 
conflicting elements." Id. at 194. To avoid realizing the nonexistence of an objective 
vantage point from which to choose between conflicting impulses, the public denies the 
possibility that an abstract rule of law is elusive. However, this anxiety and denial that 
Kennedy writes of are not, as Kennedy implies, psychological problems to be excavated. 
They are well-founded. This denial is not just of the elusive nature of the rule oflaw. It is 
of the bind, the paradoxical trap that the rule oflaw is at the same time elusive and crucial to 
effectuating the type of normative justice that leftist, feminist legal actors envision. 
129. In addition to being necessary for the development and enforcement of feminist (as 
well as conservative) visions of justice, an abstract rule of law sustains the distinction 
between a maker of law and an interpreter or enforcer of law on which the theory of 
separation of powers is based. Pierre Schlag writes: 
Once the law maker and the law interpreter are separated there must be something 
that links the two - something that ensures that the law made corresponds (at least 
roughly) with the law interpreted .... Get rid of that "something" - get rid of an 
"objective" law that binds, at least roughly, the law made with the law interpreted -
and the rule oflaw collapses. 
Pierre Schlag, Authorizing Interpretation, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1065, 1069-70 (1998). 
America's system of government ostensibly intends to check adjudicators' power by 
limiting that power to interpretation of law created either by the legislature or through 
precedent. The success of this intention depends upon the existence of a "law" that can be 
passed from the creator to the interpreter. Schlag continues, "the distinction between the 
law maker and the interpreter is marked out by the thing called 'law' itself-the law cast as 
a stable, objective identity. This 'objective' law serves as the marker by which the law 
maker and the law interpreter are separated in their activities." Id. at 1070. Without an 
abstract, objective rule oflaw the architecture of separation of powers becomes nonsensical. 
